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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v . • . • • 
RAMEEN REY AMIRKHIZI, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 20030639-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for two counts of possession of a controlled 
substance, third degree felonies under Utah Code Ann. § 5 8-3 7-8(2)(a)(i) (2002), in the Third 
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, the Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck presiding. This 
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether an emergency medical technician treating defendant after an accident 
who looked through defendant's backpack was engaged in state action for Fourth 
Amendment purposes. 
"(The appellate court] review[s] the factual findings underlying the trial court's denial 
of [a] defendant's motion to suppress under a clearly erroneous standard." Salt Lake City v. 
Davidson, 2000 UT App 12, ^ 8,994 P.2d 1283. "[The appellate court] will determine there 
was clear error 'only if the factual findings made by the trial court are not adequately 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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supported by the record.'"/*/. (quotingState v. Anderson, 910?.2d 1229,1232(Utah 1996)). 
However, the appellate court will review uthe trial court's conclusions of law based on such 
facts under a correctness standard, according no deference to the trial court's legal 
conclusions."/d. 
2. Whether the trooper's search of defendant's backpack was a valid search 
incident to arrest. 
This issue is reviewed under the same standard as issue No. 1. 
3. Whether analysis of the inevitable discovery doctrine is necessary to affirm. 
Because resolution of this issue does not require this Court to review any ruling of the 
district court, no standard of review applies. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Resolution of this appeal does not require the Court to interpret any constitutional 
provision, statute, or court rule. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ' 
Defendant was charged by Information dated 27 September 2002 with three third degree 
felonies and one misdemeanor: i 
Count I Possession of a controlled substance (cocaine), a third degree felony 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-3 7c-8(2)(b)(iii); 
Count II Possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), a third i 
degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37c-8(2)(b)(iii); 
Count III Possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute 
(marijuana), a third degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-
37-8; < 
2 
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Count IV Possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5. 
R. 1-2. After bindover, defendant filed a motion to suppress. R. 15,20-21. The court denied 
the motion in a six-page memorandum decision. R. 49-55 (addendum A). Pursuant to a plea 
bargain, the State dismissed counts three and four and defendant entered a conditional guilty 
plea to counts one and two. R. 66-67. Defendant was placed on 36-month probation and 
fined 10% of the statutory amount. R. 78-83. He timely appealed. R. 84. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
Dexter Mohler ("the EMT") is an emergency medical technician employed by the 
Evanston Fire Department, Uintah County Fire District. R. 88: 1-2, 23. On 17 September 
2002, his ambulance responded to a report of an automobile accident on Interstate 80 about 
one mile on the Utah side of the Wyoming border. R. 88: 1-2, 19. He arrived to find that a 
station wagon had left the eastbound lane, crossed the median into the westbound lane, and 
hit an embankment on the far side of the road. R. 88: 2. He saw one 
patient—defendant—standing beside the vehicle. R. 88: 2-3. Defendant walked up to the 
roadway, then was placed on a gurney. R. 88: 3. Despite having suffered some minor 
injuries, including several facial lacerations that appeared to require treatment in the hospital, 
defendant was hesitant to go with the EMTs. R. 88: 3. They explained to him that because 
of these and other possible injuries he should be seen in the emergency room. R. 88: 3. 
1
 This fact statement is based on facts presented in the preliminary hearing and recited 
in a Stipulation of Counsel Regarding Testimony of Trooper Brian Davis. See R. 32-36, R. 
88. The facts are stated in the light most favorable to the court's memorandum decision. 
3 
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Defendant had a small backpack with him when they laid him on the gurney. R. 88: 3-
4, 11. Because it was in the way as they were immobilizing him on the backboard, the EMT 
asked defendant if he could place the pack in the ambulance; defendant said yes, so the EMT 
put it between the front seats. R. 88: 12. 
At defendant's request, the EMT retrieved defendant's keys from the car. R. 88: 4. 
Because defendant was immobilized, the EMT offered to put the keys in defendant's 
backpack and defendant said he would like the EMT to do that. R. 88: 4. When the EMT 
put the keys in an outside zippered backpack pocket, he saw a prescription hydrocodone 
bottle and noticed that the name on the bottle was not defendant's. R. 88: 4, 13-14. 
The EMT picked up the pill bottle and looked at the bottom. R. 88: 5. He noticed that 
it didn't rattle when he turned it over, although a capsule was in the bottom. R. 88: 5. He 
also thought he saw some plastic in the bottle, and removed the top. R. 88: 5. Inside was a 
baggie containing very fine white powder that the EMT believed was cocaine. R. 88:5, 15. 
The EMT opened the pill bottle because he was dealing with a wreck of unknown cause 
and wondered whether defendant had taken some medication that he hadn't told the EMTs 
about. R. 88: 13. The EMT did not ask defendant what medications he had taken; because 
he knew that he would be driving and his two co-workers would be caring for defendant in 
the back of the ambulance, he "tried to step back from that so I'm not asking questions that 
they will be asking later." R. 88: 13-14. 
After seeing what he believed were drugs in the first pocket, the EMT was "a little 
concerned about what else might be in the pack," such as more drugs or even weapons. R. 
4 
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88: 16. Consequently, he opened another pocket of the backpack, where he found two 
syringes. R. 88: 6. 
The EMT had received drug recognition training from the fire department, the 
ambulance service, and the Wyoming Department of Criminal Investigations. R. 88: 7, 17. 
Its purpose was to make EMTs aware of potential problems they might encounter in fire 
situations and for their own safety—to avoid needle sticks and so forth. R. 88: 8. The EMT 
had been involved with other drug-related arrests, "mostly dealing with house fires where 
everything was left in the open." R. 88: 18. Based on his training and experience, the EMT 
believed he had discovered controlled substances. R. 88: 7. 
The EMT told the nurse that he had found the syringes and the other things "to kind of 
give him a heads up to be a little more cautious with the patient and maybe give him a line 
of questioning to talk to the patient about what was in the pack." R. 88: 6. The EMT also 
informed law enforcement personnel. R. 88: 6-7. 
In this incident, the EMT saw his primary function as being an "ambulance driver," not 
an "investigator," even after discovering the drugs. R. 88: 19. His "point then was to just 
pass on the information to [law enforcement officers] and let them do their job." R. 88: 19. 
He passed it on to two Wyoming Highway Patrolmen: Randy Chandler, who arrived at about 
the same time as the ambulance, and Ron Woodward, who arrived shortly after. R. 88: 19. 
Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Brian Davis also arrived at the scene in response to an 
injury accident report. R. 88:25-26. Deputy Chandler informed him that he knew defendant 
and that he had a drug history. R. 88: 26. He also told Trooper Davis that defendant had 
5 
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objected when Chandler had offered to carry his backpack. R. 88:27. Finally, Chandler told 
Trooper Davis what the EMT had observed while putting defendant's keys into the backpack. 
R. 88:27. / ~. 
Based on this information, Trooper Davis went to the ambulance to talk to defendant.
 i 
R. 88: 27. He asked if there was anything illegal in the backpack; defendant said no. R. 88: 
27. He asked if he could search it; defendant again said no. R. 88: 27. Trooper Davis 
determined that he did not need to obtain a search warrant because the "unusual 
circumstances" of the case coupled with the information he learned from Deputy Chandler 
and defendant's refusal to consent to a search "constituted an exception to the warrant { 
requirement." R. 34-35. ! 
In the backpack Trooper Davis found the pill bottle containing a plastic bag with a 
white powdery substance, a second plastic bag containing a crystal-like substance that he 
suspected was methamphetamine, a third bag containing a substance he suspected was 
marijuana, and three pill capsules containing a white powdery substance. R. 88: 27. The 
white powdery substance field-tested positive for cocaine. R. 88: 29. j 
Trooper Davis then arrested defendant and, incident to the arrest, searched his car, i 
finding marijuana residue. R. 88: 30, R. 35. J 
6 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The EMT was not a state actor for Fourth Amendment purposes when he looked 
through defendant's backpack. Not all government employees are subject to Fourth 
Amendment restrictions; whether the acts of a non-law enforcement government employee 
implicate the Fourth Amendment turns primarily on the employee's intent. 
The district court found that the EMT was acting in the interest of defendant's medical 
care and his own safety, not law enforcement, when he looked through the pack. Defendant 
neither attacks these findings as clearly erroneous nor marshals the evidence supporting 
them; accordingly, his claim fails. In any event, record evidence supports the findings. 
2. Trooper Davis's search of defendant's backpack was a valid search incident to 
arrest under the controlling three-factor test. 
First, the arrest was lawful because it was supported by probable cause. The EMT was 
a reliable citizen informant who knew Deputy Chandler. His knowledge was based on 
personal observation and was corroborated by Deputy Chandler's prior knowledge of 
defendant's drug history and his observation that defendant had been suspiciously protective 
of the backpack. Second, the trooper searched an area within defendant's immediate control: 
the interior of the ambulance. Defendant does not argue otherwise. Third, the search was 
contemporaneous with the arrest because the arrest followed quickly on its heels. 
3. The district court invoked the inevitable discovery doctrine unnecessarily, 
apparently on the erroneous assumption that a search must follow an arrest to be incident to 
it. Resort to inevitable discovery is unnecessary to affirm. 
7 
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ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues that the EMT's search of defendant's backpack violated the Fourth 
Amendment because the EMT's "exploration of the contents of [defendant's] backpack 
cannot be viewed as a private search." Brief of Aple. at 8. He argues further that, even if the 
EMT's search was permissible and thus furnished probable cause, Trooper Davis's search 
violated the Fourth Amendment because "no exception to the warrant requirement permitted 
him to do a warrantless search." Brief of Aple. at 16 (underlining omitted). Finally, he 
argues that the requirements of the inevitable discovery doctrine have not been met here. 
See Brief of Aple. at 19-26. • 
In a detailed Memorandum Decision, the district court found that the EMT was not 
engaged in state action for Fourth Amendment purposes when he looked into the backpack 
and pill bottle. R. 52 (addendum A). The court further found that Trooper Davis "had 
probable cause to arrest or search the backpack after talking with the Wyoming officer," but 
it found "no exceptions to the warrant requirement here that justified the search." R. 52-53. 
Finally, the court ruled that "the evidence here would have been lawfully obtained by other 
means," specifically, "a lawful probable cause arrest followed by a search incident to arrest 
or inventory search." R. 53. 
8 
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POINTI 
THE EMERGENCY MEDICAL TECHNICIAN TREATING 
DEFENDANT AFTER the ACCIDENT WHO LOOKED THROUGH 
DEFENDANT'S BACKPACK WAS NOT ENGAGED IN STATE 
ACTION FOR FOURTH AMENDMENT PURPOSES 
Defendant claims that when the EMT continued to look through defendant's backpack 
after depositing defendant's keys and seeing the suspicious pill bottle he "engaged in state 
action for purposes of the Fourth Amendment..." Brief of Aple. at 8. 
The Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures is not 
limited to operations conducted by police. New Jersey v. 7!Z,.(9.,469U.S. 325, 335 (1985). 
The Supreme Court has applied the Fourth Amendment's restraints to civil governmental 
action such as building inspectors, see Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 
(1967), OSHA inspectors, see Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1978), and 
fire investigators, see Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 506 (1978). 
However, "[t]he types of non-law enforcement conduct to which the Court has extended 
the scope of the amendment are . . . typically motivated by some sort of investigatory or 
administrative purpose designed to elicit a benefit for the government." United States v. 
Attson, 900 F.2d 1427, 1430 (9th Cir.), cert denied 498 U.S. 961 (1990). "The relevant 
authority under the Fourth Amendment focuses not on whether a state actor is involved, but 
on whether non-law enforcement government employees' acts are 'state action' subject to 
the Fourth Amendment's strictures." State v. Ellingsworth, 966 P.2d 1220,1222 (Utah App. 
1998). 
9 
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Thus, "for the conduct of a governmental party to be subject to the Fourth Amendment, 
the governmental party engaging in that conduct must have acted with the intent to assist the 
government in its investigatory or administrative purposes and not for an independent 
purpose." Id. at 1223 {(\\xoimg Attson, 900F.2dat 1433). Applying this rule in Ellingsworth, 
this Court held that the Fourth Amendment was not implicated when a Workers' 
Compensation Fund adjustor obtained defendant's medical records "solely to determine 
defendant's eligibility for workers compensation benefits," but later turned them over to the 
Attorney General. Ellingsworth, 966 P.2d at 1225. 
A. The district court found that the EMT was motivated by a concern for 
defendant's medical care and personal safety, not by law enforcement. 
The district court concluded that the EMT "was not acting as a law enforcement officer 
and this was thus not state action." R. 52 (addendum A). Accordingly, "[t]he Fourth 
Amendment is not implicated by Mohler's actions." Id. 
In support of these conclusions the court entered numerous factual findings. It found 
that the EMT was acting with a medical, not a law enforcement, purpose: "His intent was 
proper and was to determine if defendant had anything that may have contributed to the 
single-car accident or that may be important in treatment. He was also motivated by personal 
safety [,] which the court finds not to be improper or a law enforcement motive." Id, The 
court was not concerned that the EMT did not ask defendant about his drug use: "While 
Mohler did not and easily could have asked defendant if he had taken anything, that is not 
the only reasonable course for medical personnel to take. It is not unimaginable that a person 
10 
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who has consumed a substance or alcohol would not admit it to an EMT." Id. The court 
further found that "Mohler opened the backpack for a legitimate purpose, to put the keys into 
the backpack. Having seen the pill bottle then, Mohler acted reasonably and not as a law 
enforcement authority nor with law enforcement intent. He acted out of personal safety and 
for proper medical reasons." Id. 
B. Defendant is bound by the court's findings because he neither attacks 
them as clearly erroneous nor marshals the evidence supporting them. 
The findings of fact underlying the district court's denial of defendant's motion to 
suppress are entitled to deference and may be rejected on appeal only if clearly erroneous. 
See State v. Fridleifson, 2002 UT App 322, U 7, 57 P.3d 1098. 
A party challenging a factual finding on appeal must marshal the evidence supporting 
that finding. He or she must "present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of 
competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant 
resists," then demonstrate that there is a "fatal flaw in the evidence." West Valley City v. 
Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App.1991) (emphasis in original). "The 
gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to convince the appellate court that the trial court's 
finding resting upon the evidence is clearly erroneous." Id. at 1315. The marshaling 
requirement entails reverse advocacy: "an exhaustive or voluminous recitation of all the facts 
presented at trial, even if this recitation includes within its body the facts that support the 
challenged ruling," is insufficient, especially where defendant merely reargues the evidence 
11 
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favorable to his position. Neely v. Bennett, 2002 UT App 189, If 12,51 P.3d 724, cert, denied 
59 P.3d 603 (2002). 
When an appellant fails to meet the "heavy burden" of marshaling the evidence, the 
appellate court will assume that the record supports the findings of the trial court. Moon v. 
Moon, 1999 UT App 12, ^  24, 973 P.2d 431. 
Defendant here has failed to meet his heavy burden. While acknowledging in principle 
that a district court's factual findings are entitled to deference, Brief of Aple. at 1-2, 
defendant ignores the findings entered in this case. See Brief of Aple. at 13-16. He neither 
assails them as clearly erroneous, nor marshals the evidence supporting them. Instead, he 
merely reargues the evidence favorable to his position. See id. 
Consequently, this Court should accept the district court's findings that the EMT "acted 
out of personal safety and for proper medical reasons," and "not with law enforcement 
intent." R. 52.2 
2
 In any event, the record supports the district court's findings. The EMT testified that 
he opened the pill bottle because he was dealing with a wreck of unknown cause and 
wondered whether defendant had taken some medication that he hadn't told the EMTs about. 
R. 88: 13. After seeing what he believed were drugs, he was "a little concerned about what 
else might be in the pack," such as more drugs or even weapons. R. 88: 16. Consequently, 
he opened another pocket of the backpack, where he found two syringes. R. 88: 6. 
Upon finding the pills and syringes, the EMT told the nurse what he had found "to 
kind of give him a heads up to be a little more cautious with the patient and maybe give him 
a line of questioning to talk to the patient about what was in the pack." R. 88: 6. The EMT 
testified that he did not see himself functioning as an investigator: "my point then was to just 
pass on the information to [law enforcement officers] and let them do their job." R. 88: 19. 
12 
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C. The district court correctly concluded that the EMT's actions did not 
implicate Fourth Amendment. 
As stated above, "for the conduct of a governmental party to be subject to the Fourth 
Amendment, the governmental party engaging in that conduct must have acted with the intent 
to assist the governmental in its investigatory or administrative purposes and not for an 
independent purpose." Ellingsworth, 966 P.2d at 1223 (quoting Attson, 900 F.2d at 1433). 
The court found that the EMT did not act "with law enforcement intent. He acted out of 
personal safety and for proper medical reasons." R. 52. Accordingly, its conclusion that 
"[t]he Fourth Amendment is not implicated," id, is indisputably correct. 
POINT II 
THE TROOPER'S SEARCH OF DEFENDANT'S BACKPACK WAS A 
VALID SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST 
Although the EMT was not acting "with law enforcement intent," once he did run 
across drugs, he reported them to the law officers on the scene. R. 88: 19. Based on this 
information and a conversation with defendant, Trooper Davis searched defendant's 
backpack. R. 88:27. He found a plastic bag containing a white powdery substance, a second 
plastic bag containing a crystal-like substance that he suspected was methamphetamine, a 
third bag containing a substance he suspected was marijuana, and three pill capsules 
containing a white powdery substance. R. 88:27. The white powdery substance field-tested 
positive for cocaine. R. 88: 29. The trooper then arrested defendant and, incident to the 
arrest, searched his car. R. 88: 30, R. 35. 
13 
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Because the EMT's actions did not constitute state action for Fourth Amendment 
purposes, the drugs and paraphernalia he discovered are available to support a finding of 
probable cause for Trooper Davis's search of defendant's backpack. 
However, defendant claims that "[e]ven if Trooper Davis had probable cause to search 
the backpack, no exception to the warrant requirement permitted him to do a warrantless 
search." Brief of Aple. at 16 (underlining omitted). Specifically, defendant argues that 
"[t]he search of the backpack was not done incident to arrest, since [defendant] was not yet 
under arrest, and Davis did not have probable cause to make an arrest at that point." Brief 
of Aple. at 17. 
District court's ruling. The district court upheld the search, not as a search incident 
to arrest, but under the inevitable discovery doctrine. R. 53 (addendum A). Although 
Trooper Davis "had probable cause to arrest or search the backpack after talking with the 
Wyoming officer," the court found "no exceptions to the warrant requirement here that 
justified the search." R. 52-53. However, the court ruled that, "[b]ased on that information 
from the Wyoming officer alone Davis could have lawfully arrested defendant for possession 
of drug paraphernalia and possession of a controlled substance." R. 53. Consequently, "the 
evidence here would have been lawfully obtained by other means," specifically, "a lawful 
probable cause arrest followed by a search incident to arrest or inventory search." R. 53. 
Alternative ground. "It is well settled that an appellate court may affirm the judgment 
appealed from 'if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even 
though such ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be the basis of its 
14 
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ruling or action . . . ' " State v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, ^  9, 76 P.3d 1159 (quoting Bailey v. 
Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ^  10, 52 P.3d 1158, in turn quoting Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, ^ 
18,29 P.3d 1225) (additional citations omitted)); see also Limb v. Federated Milk Producers 
Ass 72, 23 Utah 2d 222, 225-26 n. 2, 461 P.2d 290, 293 n. 2 (1969); 5 C.J.S. Appeal & Error 
§ 714 (1993). The alternative theory "must also be sustainable by the factual findings of the 
trial court." Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, ^ 9. See also State v. Chevre, 2000 UT App 6, ^ 17, 
994 P.2d 1278 (affirming search as incident to arrest although district court found an 
inventory search). 
Although the court relied on inevitable discovery, "the search incident to arrest 
conclusion is more readily supported by the record and fully consistent with the trial court's 
ruling." State v. Chansamone, 2003 UT App 107, U 10, 69 P.3d 293. 
Search incident to arrest. A contemporaneous, warrantless search of the area within 
an arrestee's immediate control is permissible for the purpose of recovering weapons the 
arrestee might reach or to prevent concealment or destruction of evidence of crime. Chimel 
v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969). "The fact of a lawful arrest, standing alone, 
authorizes [the] search." Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 35 (1979). A search incident 
to arrest is justified if "(1) the arrest is lawful; (2) the search is of the area within the 
arrestee's immediate control; and (3) the search is conducted contemporaneously to the 
arrest." State v. Giron, 943 P.2d 1114, 1117-18 (Utah App. 1997) (citations omitted). 
A post-search arrest is contemporaneous where it "follow[s] quickly on the heels of the 
challenged search." Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111 (1980). "[Tjhat the search 
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preceded the arrest rather than vice versa" is not "particularly important." Id. Neither is the 
officer's subjective intent: "Whether or not the officer intended to actually arrest the 
defendant at the time of the search is immaterial..." United States v. Anchondo, 156 F.3d 
1043, 1045 (10th Cir 1998). 
The court's findings and the record demonstrate that the three requirements for a search 
incident to arrest were present here. 
A. Defendant's arrest was lawful because it was supported by probable 
cause. 
Defendant's arrest was lawful because it was supported by probable cause. "[P]robable 
cause justifying an arrest" requires '"facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge 
that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in 
the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to 
commit an offense.'" State v. Trane, 2002 UT 97,1f 27, 57 P.3d 1052 (quoting DeFillippo, 
443 U.S. at 37). 
Where a finding of probable cause rests upon information received from an informant, 
this Court "must examine the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the 
informant's tip, together with police observations, provided probable cause to arrest" the 
defendant. Chansamone, 2003 UT App 107, % 11 (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). "Factors to consider... include an informant's veracity, reliability[,] and basis of 
knowledge." Id (quoting State v. Purser, 828 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)) 
(alteration in the original). 
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"
6[B]ecause citizen informers, unlike police informers, volunteer information out of 
concern for the community and not for personal benefit,"' this Court will "presume the 
reliability and veracity of citizen informers." Id. at ^  12 (quoting Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 
943 P.2d 231,235 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)) (alteration in original). UA citizen informant is 'an 
average citizen who is in a position to supply information by virtue of having been a crime 
victim or witness.'" Chansamone, 2003 UT App 107,112 (quoting State v. White, 851 P.2d 
1195, 1199 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)). "In contrast, 4[a] police informant is one who gains 
information through involvement in criminal activity or who is motivated . . . by pecuniary 
gain.'" Chansamone, 2003 UT App 107, % 12, n.4 (quoting Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 235 n.2) 
(quotations and citation omitted) (omission in original)). 
The district court here correctly concluded that Trooper Davis had probable cause to 
arrest defendant before he searched his backpack: 
Davis had the necessary information to arrest defendant, even before looking into 
the backpack. He had been advised that the backpack contained syringes and 
possibly cocaine. Based on that information from the Wyoming officer alone 
Davis could have lawfully arrested defendant for possession of drug paraphernalia 
and possession of a controlled substance. 
R.53. 
The district court's finding of probable cause is supported by the record. After 
observing syringes and what appeared to be a baggie of cocaine in defendant's backpack, the 
EMT, a citizen informant, passed this information along to Wyoming Highway Patrolman 
Randy Chandler, who in turn informed Trooper Davis. R. 88: 19-27. Patrolman Chandler 
informed Trooper Davis of the following: 
17 
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a. That [defendant] had a "known drug history" (although there were no 
specifics given and no evidence of any arrests or convictions); 
b. That when Deputy Chandler tried to assist [defendant] by carrying 
[defendant's] backpack for him from the damaged vehicle to the ambulance, 
[defendant] grabbed it from the deputy, insisting on carrying himself; 
c. Deputy Chandler said that the ambulance driver (Dexter Mohler) said 
that he had searched the said backpack and found a prescription drug vial which 
contained a white powder the ambulance driver believed to be cocaine and some 
syringes. . . . 
R. 33-34. These facts support the district court's finding of probable cause. A reliable 
citizen informant actually saw the drugs in the backpack of a known drug user, who was 
acting suspiciously protective of the pack. 
In State v. Chansamone this Court found probable cause on similar facts. There, a club 
bouncer followed Chansamone into a restroom, where he saw him holding a "baggie with 
some white stuff in it." Chansamone, 2003 UT App 107, ^ j 2. The bouncer called a police 
officer, who entered the restroom, whereupon the bouncer told him he had seen the baggie. 
Id. at II3. Chansamone was pretending to vomit into the toilet, but kept reaching for his right 
pants pocket. Id. at \ 4. The officer ordered Chansamone to stand up, searched him, and 
found a baggie of cocaine. Id. at K 5. The officer knew the bouncer and considered him 
credible. Id. at^ f 6. 
This Court presumed the bouncer to be a reliable citizen informant, since there was no 
indication he received anything for the information. Id. at \ 12. His reliability was also 
bolstered because the officer knew him. Id. at ^  13. The bouncer's basis of knowledge was 
strong because he based his information on personal observation of the drugs and because 
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of his past experience witnessing illegal drugs. Id. Finally, the officer's own observations 
corroborated the bouncer's information. Id. at ^ 14. 
Under the totality of the circumstances, this Court found probable cause for the officer 
to arrest Chansamone prior to the search: "The informant's veracity, reliability, and basis of 
knowledge are all strong, and the officer's observations of Chansamone were consistent with 
[the bouncer's] information." Id. at f^ 15. 
Here, the EMT was a reliable informant because he was a citizen informant who was 
not involved in crime and there is no indication he received anything for the information. His 
reliability was also bolstered because he was a county employee. R. 88:1-2, 23.3 His basis 
of knowledge was strong, because he based his information on personal observation of the 
cocaine and syringes in defendant's backpack. R. 88: 13-16. Furthermore, the EMT's 
information was corroborated by Deputy Chandler's prior knowledge of defendant's drug 
history and his observation that defendant had been suspiciously protective of the backpack, 
both of which were also communicated to Trooper Davis. See R. 88: 26. 
3
 The EMT also knew Deputy Chandler "fairly well." R 88: 21. However, Deputy 
Chandler apparently did not communicate this information to Trooper Davis. See R. 33-34. 
Whether information not communicated to the arresting officer should figure into the 
probable cause calculus is unclear. Compare Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 234 (where officer relies 
on dispatch, issue is whether the dispatch was based on reasonable suspicion rather than 
officer's knowledge) and Chansamone, 2003 UT App 107, f 13 (stating that bouncer's 
reliability was enhanced by his personal observations of Chansamone and his experience with 
drugs, despite absence of any indication he conveyed this information to arresting officer) 
with State v. Despain, 2003 UT App. 266, f 10, n.3, 74 P.3d 1176 (when suspect is stopped 
by two officers and detained by one of them, non-detaining officer's uncommunicated history 
with suspect is immaterial to reasonable suspicion analysis). In any event, the EMT's and 
Deputy Chandler's acquaintanceship is unnecessary to a finding of probable cause here. 
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Accordingly, like the officer in Chansamone, Trooper Davis had probable cause to 
arrest defendant. 
B. The searched area was within defendant's immediate control, since both 
defendant and the backpack were inside the ambulance. 
A search incident to arrest must be limited to the "area within the arrestee's immediate 
control." Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762-63. Defendant does not argue that the backpack was 
outside his immediate control. 
In any event, this factor is satisfied because both defendant and the backpack were in 
the interior of the ambulance. R. 53, R. 88: 11-12, 27. See Chevre, 2000 UT App 6, ^ 17 
(search of bundles in sleeper portion of tractor truck cab subject to search incident to arrest 
of defendant, who was outside the truck at the time of the search); State v. Harrison, 805 
P.2d 769, 784-85 (Utah App.) (diaper bag ten feet away from guarded suspects was subject 
to search incident to their arrest), cert, denied 817 P.2d 327 (1991). Even if defendant was 
strapped to the gurney, that factor, though relevant, is not dispositive. State v. Wells, 928 
P.2d 386, 391 n.6 (Utah App. 1996). 
C. The search was contemporaneous with the arrest. 
The search was contemporaneous with the arrest. That the search "occurred moments 
before the formal arrest is insignificant." State v. Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 220, 227 (Utah App. 
1995). An arrest is contemporaneous so long as it "followed quickly on the heels of the 
challenged search." Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 111. Here it did. According to the stipulation of 
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the parties, Trooper Davis searched defendant's backpack, finding "cocaine, 
methamphetamine, marijuana and paraphernalia. He then arrested defendant." R. 34. 
Defendant argues that "[t]he transcript of the preliminary hearing does not indicate 
whether [defendant] was in fact placed under arrest at the scene of the accident, after Davis 
searched the backpack, or if the arrest came sometime later, either at the hospital or after 
[defendant's] release from the hospital." Brief of Aple. at 23-24, n.5. On the contrary, 
Trooper Davis testified, "After we discovered [the cocaine] we performed a search incident 
to arrest of the vehicle." R. 88: 30. 
The most reasonable reading of Trooper Davis's testimony and the parties' stipulation 
is that he arrested defendant at the scene of the accident shortly after finding the drugs. 
Nothing in the record supports defendant's speculation that the arrest may have occurred at 
the hospital or after defendant's release from the hospital, nor does he suggest why, having 
found the drugs, Trooper Davis would not have arrested defendant on the spot. 
This Court should affirm the ruling of the district court on the alternative ground that 
the search was a valid search incident to defendant's arrest. 
POINT III 
ANALYSIS OF THE INEVITABLE DISCOVERY DOCTRINE IS 
UNNECESSARY TO AFFIRM 
The district court relied on the inevitable discovery doctrine to deny defendant's motion 
to suppress the drugs. The court found that "the evidence here would have been lawfully 
obtained by other means," specifically, "a lawful probable cause arrest followed by a search 
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incident to arrest or inventory search." R. 53. Since the challenged search was incident to 
a lawful arrest, resort to inevitable discovery was unnecessary below and is unnecessary on 
appeal. 
Nevertheless, that the district court would feel a need to invoke the inevitable discovery 
doctrine in the face of findings that so clearly support a search incident to arrest is puzzling. 
It apparently did so on the mistaken assumption that a lawful search incident to arrest must 
precede the arrest. The court concluded that Trooper Davis had probable cause to arrest: 
Davis had the necessary information to arrest defendant, even before looking into 
the backpack. He had been advised that the backpack contained syringes and 
possibly cocaine. Based on that information from the Wyoming officer alone 
Davis could have lawfully arrested defendant for possession of drug paraphernalia 
and possession of a controlled substance. 
R. 53. The court then continued, "Subsequent to that arrest, Davis could have and would 
have been required to take the backpack into his possession," and eventually searched it. R. 
53 (emphasis added). Similarly, the court referred to ua lawful probable cause arrest 
followed by a search incident to arrest or inventory search." Id. (emphasis added). 
Apparently, the court resorted to inevitable discovery to solve what it viewed as the problem 
of the search preceding the arrest. 
Accordingly, this Court should, as it did in Chansamone, simply ignore the district 
court's stated ground and hold that "the search incident to arrest conclusion is more readily 
supported by the record and fully consistent with the trial court's ruling." Chansamone, 2003 
UTApp 107,^110. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on/ ^February 2004. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
RICTVOROS, J 
stant Attorney General 
*, Appeals Division 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RAMEEN RAY AMIRKHIZI, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 01500232 
Honorable BRUCE C. LUBECK 
February 12, 2003 
The above matter came before the court for decision an 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress. 
BACKGROUND 
An Information was filed against defendant On September 27, 
2002, charging him with various possessory drug offenses. A 
preliminary hearing was held November 19, 2002. Defendant filed 
a motion to suppress on November 29, 2002. Defendant alleged a 
search of defendant's backpack was without warrant and unlawful 
under the Fourth Amendment. 
On February 3, 2002, the parties stipulated that certain 
preliminary hearing testimony should be considered by the court. 
That is, the preliminary hearing testimony, as supplemented by-
further stipulated facts. No new evidentiary hearing was held. 
Defendant filed a memorandum in support of his motion-that date. 
The State filed a response on February 10, 2003, together with a 
request for a ruling. The State indicated that defendant was not 
going to file a reply. Neither party requested oral argument. 
The court has reviewed the pleadings of the parties, the 
transcript, and the entire file, and concludes as follows. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On September 17, 2002, Dexter Mohler was an employee of 
the Evanston, Wyoming, Fire Department and an EMT. 
2. He responded to a call of a single-car accident on 
Interstate 80 that proved to be just west of the Utah-Wyoming 
border in Utah, at mile post 196. 
3. Arriving at the scene he found that an eastbound vehicle 
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had gone through the median and went across the west bound lanes 
and hit the dirt embankment. 
4. Mohler found defendant was standing by the wrecked 
vehicle. Defendant had minor facial lacerations and other minor 
injuries and so he was placed on a gurney for transportation to 
the hospital, though he did not want to be taken to the hospital. 
5. Defendant had a small backpack with him. Defendant 
carried that while he laid on the gurney and after the gurney was 
loaded into the ambulance, the backpack was in the vehicle. 
After being put in the ambulance on the gurney, defendant asked 
Mohler to get defendant's keys from defendant's vehicle. Mohler 
asked if he should put the keys in the backpack and defendant 
said yes, so Mohler put the keys in an outside compartment of the 
backpack, which had been put in the ambulance. 
6. When Mohler zipped open an outer compartment to put the 
keys in the backpack he saw a small pill bottle. The pill bottle 
contained a label for Hydrocodone. The label bore a name other 
than defendant's name. Mohler removed the bottle and opened it 
because it had something in it but did not rattle, though there 
was a capsule observable in the bottle. Mohler wanted to know if 
the contents related to the accident in any way, though Mohler 
did not ask defendant if he had been taking any medications. 
Upon opening the bottle Mohler observed a baggie with white 
powder in it. 
7. Mohler opened another pocket in the backpack and saw two 
syringes. He opened the other compartment in part to see if any 
weapons were present or to see if there was any danger to him or 
others. Mohler left the baggie in the bottle and left the bottle 
and syringes in the backpack. 
8. Mohler advised a Wyoming law enforcement officer on the 
scene as to what Mohler had seen in the backpack. 
9. Mohler has received training in drug detection from 
Wyoming law enforcement authorities as part of his EMT 
responsibilities and believed the white powder to be a controlled 
substance, probably cocaine. 
10. Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Brian Davis arrived at the 
scene shortly after the foregoing events, though the ambulance 
was still on the scene. The Wyoming officer told Davis that he 
knew defendant and defendant had a known drug history though 
there were no other details given to Davis or stated in court. 
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11. The Wyoming officer advised Davis that when defendant 
was being taken to the ambulance the officer offered to carry 
defendant's backpack and defendant insisted that he carry it 
himself, pulling it back from the officer. 
12. The Wyoming officer also advised Davis that Mohler had 
observed some syringes and a pill bottle in the backpack and the 
bottle contained a white powder Mohler believed to be cocaine. 
No other information was given to Davis about why Mohler believed 
the substance was cocaine. Davis knew the bottle and syringes 
remained in the backpack. 
13. Davis went to the ambulance and talked with defendant. 
Davis asked if there was anything illegal in the backpack and 
defendant said no. 
14. Davis asked permission to search the backpack and 
defendant said no. 
15. Davis seized and searched the backpack without consent 
or a warrant, believing he had probable cause to do so and due to 
what he described as the unusual events. In the course of the 
search of the backpack Davis found the white powdery substance 
and a second plastic bag that contained methamphetamine and a 
third bag with marijuana. Those items form the basis of the 
charges in this case. 
16. A drug detection dog then assisted in a search of the 
vehicle and further marijuana residue was located in the 
defendant's vehicle. 
ARGUMENTS 
Defendant contends under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution that the search was unlawful. He argues that Mohler 
was a "state" actor when he searched the backpack without 
permission and without warrant and without probable cause. In. 
addition, defendant argues, even if Mohler acted properly, the 
information given to Davis was insufficient, so Davis had no 
basis to conduct the search without a warrant. 
The State argues that Mohler was not acting in a law 
enforcement capacity but only as medical personnel, and not at 
the behest of government officials. The State also argues there 
was an exception to the warrant requirement, that is, inevitable 
discovery. 
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DISCUSSION and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. CONSENT. 
There is no consent here to a search. Defendant consented 
only to allow Mohler to put the keys into the backpack. 
Defendant did not consent to any further search by Mohler or 
anyone else. 
2. STATE ACTION 
The court concludes that Mohler was not acting as a law 
enforcement officer and this was thus not state action. His 
intent was proper and was to determine if defendant had anything 
that may have contributed to the single-car accident or that may 
be important in treatment. He was also motivated by personal 
safety which the court finds not to be improper or a law 
enforcement motive. While Mohler did not and easily could have 
asked defendant if he had taken anything, that is not the only 
reasonable course for medical personnel to take. It is not 
unimaginable that a person who has consumed a substance or 
alcohol would not admit it to an EMT. Mohler did not know of 
defendant's alleged drug history.1 Mohler was not asked by law 
enforcement to search defendant's belongings. Mohler opened the 
backpack for a legitimate purpose, to put the keys into the 
backpack. Having seen the pill bottle then, Mohler acted 
reasonably and not as a law enforcement authority nor with law 
enforcement intent. He acted out of personal safety and for 
proper medical reasons. The Fourth Amendment is not implicated by 
Mohler's actions. 
3. PROBABLE CAUSE. 
Even though Davis did not address Mohler directly, Davis had 
probable cause to arrest or search the backpack after talking 
with the Wyoming officer. Mohler had communicated the 
information he observed to a Wyoming officer, who in turn 
communicated that information to Davis. 
Probable cause is less than certainty, less than beyond a 
reasonable doubt, less than preponderance, and less than a prima 
facie showing. The totality of the circumstances is to be 
considered. Probable cause is a fair probability that evidence or 
contraband will be found. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 
!No evidence was introduced that in fact defendant had a 
drug history. 
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(1983) . 
Here, even though the information Davis had was not directly 
from Mohler, Davis had enough information that the court 
concludes he had probable cause to arrest defendant before the 
unauthorized search and had probable cause to search. 
However, having probable cause is not a sufficient basis to 
conduct a warrantless search unless one of the well known 
exceptions to the warrant requirement applies. The State argues 
an exception applies. The court does not view "inevitable 
discovery" as an exception that justifies the warrantless search, 
as other exceptions such as plain view or exigent circumstances 
justify a warrantless search. However, the inevitable discovery 
doctrine is an exception to the exclusionary rule rather than an 
exception to the warrant requirement. The court finds no 
exceptions to the warrant requirement here that justified the 
search. 
4. INEVITABLE DISCOVERY. 
The State recognizes that just because Davis had probable 
cause to search the backpack he was not justified in so doing 
merely because Davis had that level of suspicion. Davis had the 
necessary information to arrest defendant, even before looking 
into the backpack. He had been advised that the backpack 
contained syringes and possibly cocaine. Based on that 
information from the Wyoming officer alone Davis could have 
lawfully arrested defendant for possession of drug paraphernalia 
and possession of a controlled substance. 
Subsequent to that arrest, Davis could have and would have 
been required to take the backpack into his possession and 
custody. The backpack was in the ambulance when Davis spoke with 
defendant and then seized it and searched it. The backpack would 
have been inventoried and kept secure from defendant. The drugs 
in the backpack would have been inevitably discovered by lawful 
means. 
Under the Fourth Amendment and as an exception to the 
exclusionary rule, evidence may be admitted even if illegally 
obtained if the evidence would have been inevitably discovered by 
independent, lawful means. The court concludes that the State has 
proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the evidence here 
would have been lawfully obtained by other means which means were 
lawful; that is, a lawful probable cause arrest followed by a 
search incident to arrest or inventory search. Here, Davis had 
probable cause to arrest or search, but no exceptions apply that 
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justify his search of the backpack without obtaining a search 
warrant. 
The State, even though Davis acted improperly, ought not to 
be in a worse position than if the misconduct had not occurred. 
Davis could have properly arrested defendant, taken his backpack 
and subjected it to a search incident to arrest or conducted an 
inventory search under standard procedures. 
CONCLUSION 
Mohler was not acting as a law enforcement officer with lav; 
enforcement motives when he searched defendant's backpack without 
consent. The information Mohler provided to other law 
enforcement officers, which was then communicated to still a 
third officer, amounted to probable cause to search the backpack, 
The search of the backpack was without warrant and there were no 
established exceptions that justified the search and the search 
therefore was not proper. However, the evidence can be and is 
admissible because the evidence in the backpack would have been 
inevitably discovered had t:\e officer acted lawfully, that is, 
made an arrest based on probable cause and conducted either a 
search incident to arrest or an inventory search. 
Accordingly, the motion to suppress is DENIED, 
This Ruling and Order is the Order of the court and no other 
order is required. 
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